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Information poverty, resulting from limited and distorted provision of relevant information on important 
matters, has increased the vulnerability of India’s poor to the crisis initiated by the announcement of 
demonetisation in November 2016. In this paper we draw on a study of digital finance providers and 
informal street sellers in Bangalore, conducted in the immediate aftermath of demonetisation. Using the 
theoretical lens of information poverty, we argue that technologies such as India’s biometric 
identification system (Aadhaar) do in principle help unbanked citizens obtain the digital identity that is 
needed to transact in a cashless economy. However, several design-reality gaps exist between extant 
financial technologies and the needs of informal street sellers, and digital tools seem to contribute only 
minimally to their integration in the new cashless system. Still, the marginalised communities affected 
by cashlessness hold highly valuable knowledge about the consequences of demonetisation, and use 
their first-hand information to enact a set of dynamic coping strategies. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
On November 8, 2016, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed the nation in a televised 
announcement, stating that “the 500 rupee and 1000 rupee currency notes presently in use will no 
longer be legal tender from midnight tonight”. Such notes constituted 86% of the Indian currency in 
circulation, and were suddenly made unusable for all sorts of ordinary transactions. Abrupt and 
unexpected, the demonetisation move was designed to “break the grip of corruption and black money”, 
in a cash-intensive economy whose largely informal nature allegedly maximizes opportunity for 
corruption and leakage. In the immediate aftermath of the new policy measure, a government-led survey 
revealed some popular support for it, in the midst of critique by world-class economists as Amartya Sen 
and of severe disruptions to the nation’s economic life (Ghatak, 2016; Nagarajan, 2016). 
 
Just a few months after the announcement, the demonetisation move has generated a visible backlash. 
After the short-term shock, medium-term impact is reflected in small producers and shop owners 
shutting down businesses all over the country, industrial dynamics becoming slower, and the ubiquity 
of consumption crunches across the nation (Kumar, 2017; Waknis, 2017). As observed in Lahiri (2016), 
cash shortage persisted after the announcement, and the effects on the economy, potentially as severe 
as a 2% GDP loss as former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh suggested, lead to fear that long-term 
impact will be profound. The poor and vulnerable, who conduct most of their transactions in cash, are 
likely to be hit with particular severity, unless proper specific measures are taken to help them cope 
with cashlessness (Umamaheshwari, 2016). 
 
Information is a crucial good under crisis. Coining the notion of information poverty, Elfreda A. Chatman 
(1996, 1999) sustains that marginalised groups in a society are comparatively more vulnerable to crises, 
as their condition may make it harder to obtain the information necessary to tackle problems. In a crisis 
or emergency, information is needed on what has happened, which short-term measures should be 
adopted, and what strategies can be used to cope with medium- and long-term consequences. 
Information, Chatman continues, is even more relevant when the crisis is sudden and affects core 
dimensions of people’s lives, which is in fact what happened post-demonetisation to the many unbanked 
Indians who conduct their transactions in cash. 
 
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are designed to help information flow better and 
cater to greater numbers of people. This is why ICT-based mechanisms are at the core of discussion 
in emergency management, due to their potential in quickly transmitting relevant communications and 
organising early recovery (Tusiime & Byrne, 2011). Given their quick diffusion in the developing world 
over the past two decades, ICTs and especially mobile technologies are increasingly owned and 
accessed by the poor and marginalised, affording types of intervention that could not be thought of or 
conducted before. This is why, at the onset of demonetisation, an idea of “demonetisation through 
digitalisation” emerged, arguing that the unbanked poor would be protected by use of mobile phones 
and ICT solutions tailored to their post-demonetisation needs (Ghunawat, 2016). 
 
In this paper, we assess the viability of the ”demonetisation through digitalisation” proposition with a 
study of the effects of the move on street sellers, a high share of whom are part of the large unbanked 
population of India. The study has been conducted in the immediate aftermath of demonetisation in 
Bangalore, through interviews conducted with sellers in informal street markets and with state and non-
governmental providers of digital finance. Having formed a core idea of the problem, further interviews 
have been conducted with citizens affected by demonetisation, politicians and members of volunteer 
organisations, who after demonetisation have engaged in helping unbanked communities using 
financial technologies. These sources have been triangulated with press and social media reports on 
demonetisation and its consequences, which have proliferated on Indian and international platforms for 
several months after the announcement.    
 
Based on interactions with street sellers, our study reveals that technologies such as India’s biometric 
identification system (Aadhaar) do in principle help unbanked citizens obtain digital identity. This type 
of identity is needed to transact in a cashless economy, and acquiring it is positive for the unbanked. 
However, several design-reality gaps (Heeks, 2002) exist between extant financial technologies and 
the needs of informal street sellers, in terms of technology ownership, access to informational networks, 
and infrastructural readiness for a switch to cashlessness. These gaps, emerging from respondents’ 
narratives and observed in the field, result in serious issues with the idea that digitality helps street 
sellers join the new cashless system. At the same time, the study reveals street sellers’ valuable 
knowledge on the impact of demonetisation, and shows how they enact coping strategies in response 
to the hardship encountered due to disappearance of cash. 
 
The intended contribution of this paper is twofold. First, the study has been conducted in the immediate 
aftermath of demonetisation, and provides an account of the immediate consequences of such historical 
moment on the Indian informal economy. Second, it problematises the relation between digitalisation 
and formalisation of the economy, providing the perspective of street sellers grappling with a suddenly 
cashless world. As a result, it adds to existing knowledge on digital finance for the poor, problematising 
the logic of formalisation and examining its effect on the actors involved. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we look at information poverty as the main construct that 
informs our work, and we apply it to the condition of street sellers in post-demonetisation India. We then 
describe the study, including our work in the street markets as well as with providers and promoters of 
digital finance. We then detail findings on the effects of new financial technologies, and highlight the 
gaps that prevent ICT from helping unbanked street sellers as it was supposed to. Having reflected on 
our findings, we state the contributions of the study to the field of ICT and financial inclusion. 
 
 
2. Demonetisation and Information Poverty 
 
The focus of Chatman’s theory of information poverty (1996, 1999) are the means through which people 
at the margins of the society acquire and handle information. Chatman’s interest is in “the information 
needs of people who live precariously within the brutal, marginalized world” that they live in (Chatman, 
1999: 207). The origin of such focus lies in evidence that existing theories of information do not 
adequately deal with the needs of the marginalised, and with the brutality and exclusion that often 
characterise their worlds. As a result, specific theories are devised to understand the information reality 
of diversely marginalised communities.  
 
Existing discourses on information technology and development are inspired by technology transfer, 
the social embeddedness of technology in its reality, or the transformative role of ICT in a developing 
reality (Avgerou, 2008). A discourse centred on technology transfer tends to be associated with a 
deterministic view, arguing that technology concurs to modernisation and is, therefore, needed by 
developing countries to “catch up” with industrialised ones (Akpan, 2003). Such approach fails, 
however, to account for how technology is entrenched in the lived reality of developing subjects, and 
how it is appropriated by citizens interfacing with diverse types of ICTs in light of their own needs and 
values. Diversely, theories of information poverty take the developing subject as their focus, and 
observe how information (received through diverse means) is handled by them in their daily lives. 
 
In particular, theories of information poverty acquire a socially embedded nature (Avgerou 2008, 2010) 
for two reasons. First, through her studies of women prisoners and other settings, Chatman shows that 
marginalised communities suffer comparatively deeper consequences from lack of access to relevant 
information. This is because loss of relevant information, or the lacking capability to access the world 
of “insiders, heightens a condition of fragility that already exists for “outsiders”, as it perpetuates isolation 
and limitation of opportunities” (Chatman 1996: 198). If information is itself socially embedded, the type 
and nature of information sought will depend on the characteristics of the community, as well as those 
of the social, economic, and political context in which it flows. 
 
Secondly, the value of information is not equal across time and space. Not only is it greater for 
communities that suffer from marginalisation, but it increases in situations of crisis, in which the normal 
reality is altered by transformative events as humanitarian emergencies. While information plays 
determinant roles in emergency management, these roles vary according to the phase of the 
emergency, the communities affected, and the levels of information already into place (Tusiime & Byrne, 
2011). The assumption of homogeneity of the value of information is challenged by theories of 
information poverty, which show that information is even more relevant when a crisis or emergency is 
sudden, and its depth and consequences affect core dimensions of people’s lives.   
 
A core contribution of this paper is that theories centred on the information worlds of the poor and 
marginalised offer important tools to understand the reality of the poor in post-demonetisation India. 
The announcement came unexpected, which was functional to the main objective of the move – that of 
eliminating black money from the system, making it compulsory to deposit old 500- and 1000-rupee 
notes into valid bank accounts. This could not have been achieved if the move was pre-announced, as 
holders of black money would then have had the time to convert it into legal tender through illicit means. 
While on the one hand the suddenness of the move was an integral part of the anti-corruption measure, 
effects on vulnerable communities (slum dwellers, rural villagers, people at the margins of the economy) 
have been severe, since these communities transact predominantly in cash and are generally excluded 
from formal finance. 
 
The exclusion of below-poverty-line (BPL) Indians from formal finance has two roots primarily. First, 
infrastructural readiness for banking, mobile and Internet connections is not homogeneous across the 
country. In particular, 24% of the Indian population lives without electricity (compared, for example, to 
0.2% in China),1 and gaps in electrical and mobile coverage are concentrated in rural and tribal areas. 
Hence construction of a cashless economy cannot be based on an existing backbone, but would need 
to take place largely from scratch, in a short time given the suddenness of the government’s move. 
                                                          
1 https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/world-without-power    
 Second, collateral is needed to enter the formal financial system, and it is a type of requirement that is 
not easily at hand for the large majority of the Indian poor. Reliance on informal finance, which often 
acquires the nature of exploitative moneylending (Mohan, 2006), is due to complications of entering 
formal finance, even just by opening a bank account in the absence of proper documentation. This 
reduces the opportunity for the BPL to be active part of the banking system, and leads to a situation in 
which the large majority of transactions in the country occur in cash. By inducing a nationwide switch 
to cashless means of transaction, demonetisation induces a switch to a digital economy which increases 
the traceability of money flows, but does not automatically include weaker communities.  
 
However, an idea of “demonetisation through digitalisation” has pervaded political speeches since 
shortly after the move. This is grounded on the assumption that ICT would constitute the main 
infrastructure of the new Indian economy, since transactions would be moved from the material to the 
digital domain. The role of digitalisation, in this newly imagined system, would be one of inclusion of the 
poor and vulnerable: this is because new tools, specifically designed for their inclusion, would have 
made an easier transition for them into the cashless system. 
 
To sum up, information is a crucial good under crisis, and the Indian poor and marginalised suffered 
from a sudden need for information and connectivity after demonetisation. It is hence important to ask, 
has a digital inclusion system mitigated the effects of demonetisation for the poor? 
 
 
3. Methods 
 
Our study has begun in the immediate aftermath of demonetisation, with observations conducted in 
Indian street markets from just two weeks after the move was announced. The choice of the city of 
Bangalore could, in principle, constitute a limitation, given the comparatively low concentration of 
poverty in the city (in relation, for example, to most parts of rural India) and its good levels of digital 
connections, due to the high development of the software industry. However, two factors have led us 
to pick Bangalore as our research site, the first one being the high diffusion in the city of street markets 
that live and operate in conditions of informality. Second, conducting fieldwork in Bangalore has made 
it easier to access some of the multiple digital finance providers operating on a national scale, both at 
the level of government and at that of non-governmental organisations, providing credit to the poor 
through digital means since before the demonetisation move was taken. The authors’ previous 
knowledge of the field site has helped the design of the research and access to key informants in the 
short time imposed by the suddenness of the announcement of demonetisation. 
 
Interviews with key informants including informal street sellers, digital finance providers, citizens (of 
diverse backgrounds) affected by demonetisation, politicians, members of local civic associations, and 
volunteers helping the poor to handle technological change have been conducted during three field trips 
between November 2016 and April 2017. The first field visit, held in the immediate aftermath of 
demonetisation, has focused mainly on observation in street markets and interviews with informal 
sellers, trying to grasp the main problems being faced and the coping strategies enacted in response 
to them. The two following visits, held respectively in January and April 2017, have been conducted in 
order to form a clear picture of the digital instruments involved, and in particular the technologies being 
used for the purpose of inclusion of street sellers in the formal economy. Field data have then been 
integrated with press and social media on demonetisation and its consequences, which have become 
very frequent in the months after the announcement. 
 
The corpus of data obtained from fieldwork and secondary sources has been subjected to thematic 
analysis, intended as the examination of content through categories clustered around thematic units 
(Riessman, 2008). In particular, several thematic units on ICTs, demonetisation, and the informal 
economy have been identified, to understand the extent and ways in which digital technologies have 
become entrenched in the response to the sudden cash crisis. A particular form of thematic coding 
(Boyatzis, 1998), in which codes are designed to explain a phenomenon rather than just describe it, 
has been adopted in line with the explanatory nature of our question. As a result, all data have been 
subjected to multiple rounds of analysis, first to identify relevant themes and then to relate them to the 
particular historical, geographical and political setting in which fieldwork was conducted.  
 
 
4. Digital Finance Infrastructures Before and After Demonetisation 
 
Pre-existing financial infrastructures, such as bank accounts and digital means of transaction, acquired 
a new importance in the post-demonetisation scenario. This is because newly-induced cashlessness, 
making it compulsory to deposit old 500- and 1000-rupee notes into bank or post office accounts, made 
it important for those who didn’t have one to get it, and to find ways to transact through advanced means 
such as mobiles (digital wallets) and credit-card transactions. Informal street sellers, many of whom 
were not equipped with such instruments, faced the sudden pressure to become familiar with them, 
facing obstacles that put many businesses at risk of closure.  
 
At the same time, instruments already developed for financial inclusion were tailored to the needs of 
the poor and marginalised hit by demonetisation. In particular, a set of tools developed for anti-poverty 
programmes were used to facilitate poor people’s transition into the system. Informal street sellers, 
while often unbanked, displayed awareness of these tools in our interviews. The anti-poverty tools 
developed in this respect belong to the areas of bank accounts, biometric identification, and mobile 
transactions. 
 
In the area of bank accounts, the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (most commonly known as Jan 
Dhan only) is a financial inclusion scheme launched by the current government, whose objective is that 
of enabling low-income earners and otherwise marginalised people to open zero-balance bank 
accounts. According to World Bank data, only 53% of the Indian population has a bank account,2 and 
numbers drop in rural and tribal areas where financial institutions are not easily at hand. Against this 
backdrop, the current National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government of India has launched Jan Dhan 
to increase financial inclusion, lowering the requirements to open a bank account and hence making it 
accessible to poor people. On the day of the programme’s launch, 15 million accounts were created, 
arguably connecting an equal number of families to the formal economy.3 
 
On biometric identification, India runs the biggest system in the world, known as the Unique Identity 
Project or Aadhaar (meaning “foundation” in several Indian languages). Launched in 2009 by an 
authority created specifically for this, the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), Aadhaar is a 
voluntary and free scheme which provides a 12-digit identification number and the capture of biometric 
details to all those enrolled. Conceived as the greatest biometric identification project worldwide, 
Aadhaar aims at transforming access to the public sector, by substituting a plethora of documents (often 
hard to obtain) with simple biometric access to all government schemes, including the provision of social 
benefits to the poor (Srinivasan & Johri, 2013). On paper enrolment in Aadhaar is voluntary, but as a 
result of the request for an Aadhaar number to obtain the large majority of government services, over 
99% of Indians aged 18 and above had been enrolled in Aadhaar by July 2017. This includes the 
banking system, since an Aadhaar number is now required by most financial institutions to open a bank 
account, and to perform any type of digital transactions. 
 
Finally, mobile services have been entrenched in the financial system for the last few years. As in most 
other countries, mobile numbers can be connected to bank accounts and mobile banking can be 
enabled by most financial institutions. However, one innovation that characterises India specifically is 
that of digital wallets: these are devices that allow individuals to make transactions through their mobile 
phones, receiving and disbursing money from the bank account through the mobile. These systems 
require a mobile phone device endowed with mobile Internet, and normally work through an app that, 
when downloaded, allows money flow to run through the mobile and normal transactions to be 
conducted by a text message or the capture of a QR code. 
 
The so-called JAM trinity (Jan Dhan, Aadhaar, mobile phones) was already into place before 
demonetisation, as an anti-poverty strategy aimed at making it easier for the poor to receive social 
benefits (Government of India, 2015). However, our fieldwork revealed that all the components of JAM 
have had a specific use during demonetisation. This came across from the narratives of street sellers, 
who were induced by the new situation of cashlessness to switch to the world of digital transactions, 
opening bank accounts and enabling digital wallet transactions for their businesses. This is how the 
logo of Paytm, the main digital wallet in India for volume of transactions, appeared on many informal 
                                                          
2 http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/in-india-bank-account-penetration-surges-but-43-dormant  
3 http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/pm-jan-dhan-yojana-launched-1-5-crore-bank-
accounts-opened-in-a-day/articleshow/41093413.cms  
shops in Indian cities and villages, and became an ubiquitous presence in the street markets in which 
our research was conducted, as well as the logos of other digital wallet companies. 
 
So designed, digital finance infrastructures have transformed the way of conducting normal transactions 
in the aftermath of demonetisation. This has changed normal business for informal sellers, and required 
adoption of tools with which many were not familiar before the advent of a cashless system. Our 
question, in terms of the ability of digital tools to generate inclusion of poorer people in a cashless 
economy, finds answers in the ways in which informal sellers have coped with the new system, and 
adopted (or attempted to adopt) new means of transaction.  
  
 
5. Findings 
 
With descriptions of the JAM trinity, we have outlined the digital infrastructures that participated in the 
system of transactions after demonetisation. In this section we observe the benefits of these on 
unbanked street sellers, as well as the design-reality gaps that the research revealed between the 
design of technology and the lived reality of street sellers. 
 
 
5.1.  Aadhaar and the Creation of a Digital Identity 
 
After the demonetisation policy was announced, political judgements and points of view on the move 
proliferated all over the country. Our research of social media and public platform posts about the topic 
reflected the political debate around the move: overall, “pro-demonetisation” actors supported the move 
in the light of the overarching objective of getting rid of black money, and reducing perceived corruption 
in the country. Some of the street sellers we interviewed, while admitting to have had their business 
damaged by the sudden lack of cash, put forward a proud pro-demonetisation stance, depicting it as 
an occasion in which all countrymen should be united in the common struggle against black money. For 
such common struggle, some respondents argued, it is worth to suffer damage to business for one 
month or two, in the light of the major goal of eliminating corruption. 
 
Diversely, an “anti-demonetisation” stance has been taken by many commentators and civic activists, 
concerned with the backlash of the move on the bulk of poor people who conduct their transactions in 
cash. On the one hand, some civic organisations and NGOs organised workshops and training for the 
adoption of formal finance, going to slums and villages to explain the procedures needed to open bank 
accounts or enable mobile banking on basic devices. Others, however, criticised the work of such 
organisations, based on the fact that they would abide by the new system rather than opposing the 
forced adoption of digital finance by informal street sellers. While varying degrees of depth are present 
in anti-demonetisation stances, all are grouped by characterisation of it as ineffective in the purpose of 
fighting black money, and seriously problematic for poor people who suddenly found themselves unable 
to perform even the most basic transactions. 
 
A similar divide existed, before demonetisation, on the Aadhaar project, which was a flagship scheme 
of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government before being appropriated by the NDA. While pro-
Aadhaar commentators point to the huge simplification of access to government services and pro-poor 
effects, critics of the scheme point to its implications for privacy and surveillance, and the the distortions 
it would induce by substituting existing benefits (food rations, employment guarantees) with cash 
transfers. As our days in Bangalore and analysis of social media revealed, anti-Aadhaar stances 
surfaced very powerfully after demonetisation, as cashlessness was seen as an additional measure to 
coerce people into Aadhaar registration. Enrolment in Aadhaar, the argument goes, was the only way 
for poor people to open bank accounts, and hence be recognised as part of the formal economy.  
 
While debate around these matters is fervent, all the street sellers we interviewed were already 
registered with Aadhaar before demonetisation was announced. Aadhaar identification was already 
required for most government services, and crucially for the reception of food subsidies under the Public 
Distribution System (PDS), India’s main food security scheme. Informal street sellers, many of whom 
qualify for receiving food subsidies, already obtained their Aadhaar number, however not all of them 
had used it to open a bank account. But the operation of opening one, as narrated by those that did so 
as a result of demonetisation, was simplified by possession of Aadhaar, which simplified the 
identification procedure for citizens for whom documents are not easily at hand (e.g. slum dwellers). 
 
As a result Aadhaar acted, in the post-demonetisation scenario, as a means for informal actors to 
acquire the digital identity that is needed in the new cashless system. This was very important for the 
creation of bank accounts, and for enabling digital transactions through Paytm or the other digital wallets 
whose popularity increased with demonetisation. Hence, the thesis according to which Aadhaar did 
help poorer people join the cashless economy finds support in the data, and so does the argument that 
the JAM trinity (in particular, Jan Dhan bank accounts) was relevant in this respect. In the light of this, 
it is important to recognise the benefits that digitality has brought in this context. 
 
 
5.2.  Technology Ownership 
 
While JAM technologies, and Aadhaar in particular, enabled poorer people to overcome the backlash 
of demonetisation, several gaps are identified between the needs of the surveyed population and the 
way technology was designed. The concept of information poverty, and theories developed around it, 
provide an important perspective to fully understand such gaps. 
 
It should, in the first place, be observed that ownership or not of basic technologies has significantly 
impacted the way the announcement was received by different social strata. The announcement by 
Prime Minister Modi was made in a live televised address at 8.15pm in the evening, and having stated 
that the 500- and 1000-rupee notes in use would cease to be legal tender by midnight that day, the 
Prime Minister made the point that “persons holding old notes of 500 or 1000 rupees can deposit these 
notes in their bank or post office accounts from 10 November till close of banking hours on 
30th December 2016 without any limit”. This would ensure that cash circulating at that time would not 
lose its value if stored in existing financial institutions. The announcement then specified, among other 
points, a set of special arrangements taken for humanitarian reasons, for example that old notes would 
be accepted by government hospitals and other primary-need facilities for the first 72 hours. 
 
However, many citizens of India did not learn the news from the televised announcement as it occurred. 
Possession of a TV set is not universal in the nation, for example in the state of Bihar only 14.5% 
households owns a television (Census of India, 2011). Neither is mastery of Hindi or English, the two 
languages in which the text of the announcement was originally conveyed. Many of our respondents 
learned the news through text messages or word of mouth and in their social networks: complex and 
unexpected, the announcement has arrived to many recipients in misleading forms, imbued with views 
that caused shock and panic. The announcement explained that old notes could be deposited in bank 
and post office accounts, but reached many respondents in the form of the distorted idea that old 500 
and 1000 rupee notes would lose all their value. 
 
Beyond panic among informal sellers, given the cash-based nature of most of their transactions, this 
conceptual alteration led to tragic events too. The story of Kandukuri Vinoda, a 55-year-old woman from 
Telangana state who committed suicide thinking all her cash had lost its value, illustrates the point 
dramatically, as the several people reported to have been hit by heart attacks just closely after the 
announcement. ICTs, supposed to help spread information properly, have instead been at least partially 
complicit of the mistake: reportedly, many distortions of the Prime Minister’s message reached people 
on Internet-based services such as WhatsApp or Facebook, factually fuelling the panic wave. Simplified 
and translated across many languages, the announcement made its way in a misleading form to many 
people, resulting into a range of dangerous misunderstandings. 
 
 
5.3.  Systemic Lack of Operational Information 
 
As noted above, Prime Minister Modi’s announcement pertained to the need to deposit old notes into 
bank or post office accounts, and explained the special arrangements adopted for humanitarian 
reasons. While important, this explanation of the move lacked a core dimension: the announcement, 
and the communications that followed it, gave no hint on how to open a bank or post office account, 
needed by the unbanked to deposit old notes and transact in a newly cashless economy. 
Disproportionately affected by lack of this vital information are the undocumented poor, who transact in 
cash given the lack of documents needed to open a bank account. In many cases, street sellers lacked 
the basic documentation needed, and were suddenly faced with the need to obtain it.  
 At the announcement of demonetisation, many poor and marginalised individuals faced the immediate 
necessity to change the modes of saving and transacting to which they were used. Their cash, stored 
in banknotes for many years, would now need deposit in a formal financial institution to remain valid. 
This is where information poverty emerged: many people, as the deadline for depositing old notes 
approached, were still left clueless on the procedures to open a bank account, and the scattered 
information they received from multiple sources was often conflicting. Street sellers reported disparate 
document requests coming from banks, and reports of people being turned down after long hours in 
line became frequent. Shadowing an illiterate woman in the attempt to open a bank account, one of our 
fellow researchers reported on the 16-page form in English language handed to the applicant, ultimately 
denied a debit card as unable to provide a written signature on documents.  
 
As it has been constructed, the newly created cashless economy forces the unbanked to switch to 
formal banking, with the declared objective of eliminating corruption and black money. However the 
information they receive on how to do so is often confusing, conflicting, incomplete, and often results in 
applicants being turned down at the end of long, extenuating waits. As it emerged again from street 
sellers, the documents requested (certificates of birth, residence, and similar) cannot be obtained easily, 
and in effect the information missed by many applicants is exactly on how to obtain these supporting 
documents. While ICTs are making their way through Indian bureaucracy, paperwork still dominates, 
and digitalisation cannot alone provide the information needed for these basic steps.  
 
 
5.4.  Increased Vulnerability to Exploitative Finance 
 
 
High-interest moneylending is a diffused practice in India, and reliance on it is renowned to be very high 
in the informal economy. Lack of documents, and of operational information on how to obtain them, 
makes a plethora of unbanked street sellers simply ineligible to apply for credit at a bank or formal 
institution. Previous conversations with recipients of microloans made the point clearly: even in dire and 
problematic situations, banks will not agree to lend money without guarantees, and it is a type of 
guarantees that the undocumented poor cannot easily obtain. Small business owners and people in 
need are hence often left with the only option of moneylenders, who charge high interest rates and force 
borrowers to prompt repayment through illicit means. Abusive and leading to many suicides of farmers 
and small business owners over the years (Mohanty, 2005), vulnerability to exploitative moneylending 
is entrenched in the nation’s economy, and needs radical measures to be tackled. 
 
When demonetisation comes into play, our field data reveal that this form of vulnerability is made more 
acute by two factors. The first one lies in the suddenly increased need for cash by the unbanked, who 
need small notes as transactions based on credit cards or digital means are not an option for them. If 
an unbanked street seller needs immediate cash, in the absence of better alternatives, a broker or 
moneylender is relied upon for a loan, or for dispensing small notes under payment of a high 
commission in the black market. While peer-to-peer lending platforms are making their way in the 
country, their coverage is still far too low to constitute a real alternative for the unbanked masses 
(Srinivasan, 2017). And even if their coverage was substantially higher, isolated communities 
unreached by microfinance institutions or self-help groups would still have a difficult time adjusting to a 
newly-created condition of cashlessness. 
 
The second factor lies in the discretionary power of moneylenders, which increases as a result of being 
the only option left for many of the poor. Brokers wanting to increase their repayment rates find an ideal 
contextual factor in demonetisation, as desperate need of borrowers leaves them with substantially 
greater freedom to dictate conditions. Not requiring documents or paperwork, exploitative moneylending 
flourishes under the current scenario, where complex and unknown bureaucratic procedures prevent 
many of the poor from accessing banks. Yet, as it emerged from our interviews with social workers, 
their lack of alternatives increases the bargaining power of brokers at levels even higher than before 
(Thomas, Adavi & Sreenivasa, 2017). 
 
The running argument is that digital technology bypasses the problem, by making money accessible for 
normal transactions through digital wallets. What the argument misses, however, is the infrastructure 
that lies behind the very idea of a digital wallet. Not only is the possibility of digital transactions based 
on ownership of a mobile phone or smartphone, but also of a bank or post office account, where the 
money for transactions is stored. It is here that two additional problems emerge: first, the great majority 
of digital payment operations requires a smartphone or advanced feature phone, and cannot be 
performed with a basic mobile phone as it is, for example, in the renowned m-PESA model, which made 
mobile money easy to access and use by many citizens in Kenya and other countries (Morawczynski 
& Miscione, 2008). Second, the problem of limited possibilities for the unbanked poor to access banking 
services comes back, because in the absence of a physical repository such as a bank or post-office 
account, it is impossible for digital wallets to operate.  
 
In addition, when digital wallets are called into play, access to the cashless economy is dependent on 
access to the Internet, which in India is geographically limited. The International Telecommunications 
Unit (ITU) calculates an ICT Development Index (IDI) for 175 countries, using it to monitor technology 
developments worldwide. Based on India’s IDI data (ITU, 2017), Internet access still represents a 
problem: the country is ranked 138 worldwide, behind nations (for example Gabon, Nigeria, Zimbabwe) 
that rank significantly lower on economic and human development. The problem lies especially in the 
presence of inequality between computerised megacities and large unconnected peripheries, drastically 
limiting the possibility for the latter to plan incorporation into digital networks of any sort. This relegates 
many isolated communities outside the post-demonetisation infrastructure, making it hard for them to 
reverse the economic exclusion generated in this way. 
 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion: Geographies of Exclusion and Coping Strategies 
 
When Chatman coined the notion of information poverty, she did so to encompass groups (prisoners, 
the elderly, disadvantaged women) which are already framed as vulnerable in society, and become 
more so due to asymmetric or distorted information on important matters. Our field data, collected in 
the aftermath of demonetisation, reveal that street sellers in India have been placed into such situation: 
already marginalised, they risk to become more so as a result of inability to cope with a cashless 
economy. Subjected to distortion of the original announcement, deprived of vital information on how to 
open a bank account or transact in cashless ways, informal sellers find themselves depending on 
brokers that have full discretion on rates and commissions, increasing criticality of their equilibria. While 
effects of demonetisation on curbing black money will only be observable in the longer run, the hardship 
brought on the lives of the vulnerable is sadly visible to the present day. 
 
The experience of the last months reveals deep problems with the argument that adoption of ICTs by 
the poor and marginalised can abate the issue. Inclusive technology should be a source of information 
to the poor, aimed at overcoming distortions and incompleteness. But the orthodoxy is challenged by 
problems of technology ownership as well as content: as of a recent survey by the Pew Research 
Centre, only 17% of Indian citizens own smartphones (Ananth, 2016), which cuts a substantial portion 
of the population out of the digital transactions landscape. Operationally usable content on how the 
undocumented poor can be integrated in the digital economy is scarce, which makes it difficult even for 
dedicated volunteers to help the marginalised move to the banking universe. 
 
At the same time, the phenomenon under discussion is one of which poorer people, affected by 
cashlessness from the very immediate aftermath of the Government’s move, have a better and more 
direct knowledge than everyone else in Indian society. When talks of demonetisation spark in academic 
circles, it is the voices of the disadvantaged that are most often cited: “my maid told me black money is 
in the market”, “my driver found where to change the old notes”, were sentences that were heard 
commonly in the first weeks. Street sellers are holders of important information, resulting from networks 
and direct experience: very often they know the rates charged by moneylenders, the ways 
demonetisation actually affects small businesses and producers, and the real consequences of the 
phenomenon on their lives. Acquired in direct ways, from the hardship experienced in their human and 
economic existence post demonetisation, their knowledge is first-hand and invaluable. 
 
It is on the basis of pooled, experiential knowledge that otherwise marginalised street seller 
communities organise themselves. For example, in a street market in south Bangalore, vegetable 
sellers formed a security net through which, in the immediate aftermath of the announcement, they 
systematically helped each other meet the need for cash. In slum communities observed in diverse 
parts of the city, informational exchange is constant: crucially, information seems to be sought not so 
much in the online world, but in the social networks experienced and embedded in people’s everyday 
lives. In the aftermath of such a drastic move, knowledge on demonetisation starts from the street, 
rather than from the web or mobiles: the technology of communication seems to lie, by and large, in 
lived community networks rather than phones or computers. Doing so, the poor become the most 
important information holders on the force that is reshaping the country’s economy. 
 
In conclusion, as we observe this scenario, ongoing humanitarian problems should not be neglected. 
Writing on The Lancet, Nagarajan (2016) remarks how demonetisation is affecting access to medical 
care, by limiting the possibility to purchase essential and life-saving medicines and accessing clinical 
services. This increases the need to find ways to formally tap the knowledge of marginalised 
communities, creating systems of interaction that can convert their experience into collectively helpful 
outcomes. We have already observed how all over the nation, NGOs and volunteer associations are 
organising workshops for training the poor to take part in formal banking: these should be accompanied 
by consultations on the coping strategies adopted by vulnerable groups, to generate explicit knowledge 
on how to reduce information poverty under crisis.  
 
In sum, information poverty comes with critical factors that worsen the position of unbanked street 
sellers facing demonetisation. But the information that they gain through lived experience, and that they 
validate in the social public sphere, is invaluable for many others. We conclude by suggesting, as a 
result of this, that community volunteers working with informal street sellers have a crucial role in 
ensuring that such knowledge does not remain untapped, and is instead leveraged upon for helping 
vulnerable communities throughout the nation.   
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